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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about trademark issues created by the
registration and use of Internet domain names; however, trademark
issues have arisen in a variety of other forms that result from technology
and capabilities specific to the Internet. For example, the technology
that supports the Internet allows for the creation of hypertext links that
allow Web surfers to jump from one site to another. Internet technology
also allows the use of metatags—keywords embedded into a Web site’s
computer code—that allow search engines to identify the subject matter
of the site. These Internet technologies have forced traditional trademark
law principles to evolve in order to provide remedies to trademark
holders for unauthorized uses of their trademarks in ways that are likely
to cause consumer confusion or at least allow for unfair competition.
This Article discusses how trademark law has evolved and the ground
that it still needs to cover.
II. METATAGS
A. The Technology
Metatags are one type of hypertext markup language (HTML).
HTML is the set of symbols or “tags” inserted in a file that is intended
for display on a Web browser, such as Microsoft’s Internet Explorer or
Netscape’s Navigator.1 These tags provide display instructions to the
browser or describe the document’s logical structure, such as the
location of line breaks, new paragraphs, and other display attributes that
determine the appearance of the document to the Internet user.2 HTML
tags are hidden from the normal view of a Web page, but they can be
viewed with the “view source” function.3
A metatag is the type of HTML tag that contains information about
1. See Webservice.com, HTML, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefi
nition/0,,sid26_gci212286,00.html (last visited January 16, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Noel Guivani Ramiscal, The Nature and Function of Meta-Tags: Covert
Infringement of Trademarks and Other Issues, at http://www.dcita.gov.au/crf/paper99/
ramiscal.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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the document, such as its author, its expiration date, and the time it takes
for the Web browser to reload or “refresh” the document. Thus,
metatags do not affect how the document is displayed when loaded into
a browser, but are primarily intended to be read by search engines in
order to identify, index, and catalog the content of the Web page.4
Keyword and description metatags have become subjects of
controversy. For purposes of this discussion, the term “metatag” alone
shall refer to keyword and description metatags. These metatags allow
Web site designers to choose terms (in the case of keyword metatags)
and phrases (in the case of description metatags) that refer to the subject
matter of the site.5 Internet search engines operate by identifying
keyword and description metatags6 and then compiling a list of uniform
resource locator (URL) addresses of Web pages whose metatags match
the chosen search terms.7
Thus, the primary function of metatags is to allow search engines to
easily index a site based on the keyword and description provided by the
Web site designer, thereby creating an organized environment for Web
users searching for information.8 In addition, metatags allow Web site
designers to “designate the purpose of a particular Web site that might not
wear its real identity in its address.”9 As such, selecting the content of
metatags provides Web site designers some control over traffic to their sites.
However, herein lies opportunity for the abuse of metatags: using
another’s trademark to divert Internet users that are conducting a search
for the trademark holder’s site. A search conducted using a trademark as
one of the search terms will produce results that include both the site of
the trademark holder and the site containing the trademark in its
metatag.10 In addition, the more a particular keyword or key phrase is
4. Id.
5. Scott Clark, Back to Basics: META Tags, http://www.Webdeveloper.
com/html/html_metatags.html (last updated Nov. 1998).
6. Id.
7. Ramiscal, supra note 3.
8. See Elizabeth Cohen, Getting Noticed: Using Metatags to Draw Potential
Customers to Web Sites, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1998, at 19. Metatags go beyond “free-text
searching” to use a more indexed style of search. The indexed style of searching serves
to (1) “clearly denote the contents of a highly graphical site” and (2) provide search
engine users with an “electronic confidence” that all items retrieved by the search engine
pertain to the subject of the search. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Arthur M. Peslak, Trademark and Name Issues on the Web, N.J. LAW.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 39.
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used in metatags, the higher most search engines will rank the site in its
search results. Thus, by repeating another’s trademark in its metatags, a
Web site designer can manipulate search engines to rank its site higher
than the site of the trademark holder.
B. Relevant Legal Issues
Using another’s trademark in metatags smacks of trademark
infringement, or at least some form of unfair competition. After all, it
may result in diversion of traffic from the trademark holder’s site to the
site of a third party who is seeking to capitalize or free ride off the
recognition and goodwill of that trademark. However, are the legal
elements of trademark infringement or unfair competition met? Both
sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which set forth the elements
for trademark infringement and unfair competition, require another’s
trademark to be used in commerce in connection with goods or services
that are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.11 This standard
raises several issues when applied to use of a trademark in metatags.
First, is the trademark used in commerce in connection with any goods
or services if that use is not visible to the potential customer? The
definition of the term “use in commerce” in the Lanham Act requires
some kind of affixation of the mark in connection with the goods or
services. The mark must be used (1) on goods, when “placed in any
manner on the goods or their containers, or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,” or (2) on services,
“when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services.”12
Use of a trademark in metatags cannot be described as use on goods
because the word “placed” implies some kind of visible display of the
mark. Use of a trademark in metatags could arguably fall under the
meaning of use on services because it is a use in the sale or advertising
of services offered over the Web site at issue.
The invisible nature of the use leads to the second issue: Is this use
likely to result in consumer confusion, mistake, or deception? In
contrast to the typical trademark infringement case—wherein another’s
mark is used to label one’s own goods or services—the Internet user
may never see the trademark displayed in connection with the third
party’s Web site. In fact, the third party’s Web site may clearly
distinguish itself from the trademark holder—through its own domain
name or a disclaimer. Moreover, the nature of online consumers must be
taken into account. Internet users expect a search to generate a results
11.
12.
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page that lists sites of third parties, and even competitors, in addition to
the site they seek. Thus, Internet users will be willing to filter the search
results to find the desired site when faced with a results page that lists
the trademark holder’s site and competitors’ sites.
Finally, should there be any limits to the protection afforded a
trademark holder over third parties’ uses of its mark in metatags,
particularly given that the primary function of metatags is to allow
search engines to index their content?
C. Judicial Development
1. The Limitation of Likelihood of Confusion, Mistake, or Deception
Early on, courts broadly interpreted the requirement that a mark must
be “used in commerce in connection with any goods or services” to
include use of a trademark as a metatag, although invisible. As
suggested above, courts likely found that this use occurred “in the sale or
advertising of services”13 provided at the defendant’s Web site.
However, the courts did not have to immediately face the more difficult
question of whether this invisible use resulted in a likelihood of
confusion because the early reported cases also involved a visible “bad
act” by the defendant, such as using the plaintiff’s mark as a domain
name, using images or text from the plaintiff’s Web site, or
“cyberstuffing” the defendant’s Web page with the plaintiff’s mark.14
Playboy Enterprises v. Calvin Designer Label15 is the first case in
which the parties failed to reach settlement and the court issued a
preliminary injunction against the defendants. The defendants were
adult entertainment Web site operators that used Playboy Enterprises’
trademark in connection with their Web site in the following ways: (1)
registering domain names, playboyxxx.com and playmatealive.com, that
incorporated Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks; (2) using Playboy
Enterprises’ trademarks as part of slogans on their Web sites; and (3)
invisibly cyberstuffing the marks “playboy” and “playmate” hundreds of
13. Id. (defining the term “use in commerce”).
14. Cyberstuffing is the practice of “stuffing” one’s Web page with another’s mark
or name by repeating the mark or name either in the text of the Web page or in the
background of the page. In the latter case, the mark or name that is stuffed may be the
same color as the background itself so that it is invisible or barely visible to the Internet
user. Cyberstuffing helps maximize the ranking of a particular Web site on the search
results page of search engines.
15. Playboy Enters. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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times in the background of their Web pages.16 These activities helped
the defendants rise to the top of some search engine rankings when
searches for the word “playboy” were executed.
The District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction against the defendants on likelihood of confusion
grounds.17 The defendants were enjoined from, among other things:
using in any manner the PLAYMATE or PLAYBOY trademarks, and any other
term or terms likely to cause confusion therewith . . . in buried code or metatags
on their home page or Web pages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or
information . . . or in connection with the advertising or promotion of their
goods, services or Web sites . . . .18

Thus, the court found the defendants’ use of the playboy and playmate
trademarks as metatags to misguide Internet traffic and their Web sites
to constitute a likelihood of confusion in conjunction with other, more
apparent acts of trademark infringement, such as using domain names
featuring Playboy Enterprises’ marks in connection with these sites.
Playboy Enterprises v. AsiaFocus, Int’l19 also involved the use of
Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks as metatags, in addition to other
unauthorized uses of Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks. AsiaFocus is the
first legal ruling that resulted in an award of damages. The defendants,
operators of adult entertainment Web sites containing adult photo
collections and selling related merchandise, used the trademarks
“playboy” and “playmate” as part of their domain names in the text of
their Web sites, and as metatags.20 Other factors favored a finding that
AsiaFocus’s use of the terms “playboy” and “playmate” would be likely
to cause confusion. AsiaFocus’s site consisted of computer images of
nude women, the core of Playboy Enterprises’ business.21 AsiaFocus
also offered merchandise, such as key chains, calendars, and
wristwatches under the name “Asian Playmates.”22 Playboy Enterprises
owned federal trademark registrations for each of these goods.
AsiaFocus also actively encouraged other Web sites to promote “Asian
Playmates” goods and services through a “click for cash” program, by
which the defendants offered monetary compensation to other Web site
owners who displayed the Asian Playmates banner advertisement on
their Web sites.23 Each site would receive four cents for each “hit” that
16. Id. at 1221.
17. Id. at 1221–22.
18. Id. at 1221.
19. Playboy Enters. v. AsiaFocus, Int’l, No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10359, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998).
20. Id. at *6–9.
21. Id. at *17.
22. Id. at *18.
23. Id. at *9.

346

PRINTERALBERTANDABBATI.DOC

[VOL. 40: 341, 2003]

1/30/2020 10:19 AM

Metatags, Keywords, and Links
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

AsiaFocus received from the particular Web site where the banner
advertisement appeared.24
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found “a
strong likelihood that the consuming public would believe that the
defendants’ Web site was sponsored by or somehow affiliated with
[Playboy Enterprises],”25 as well as dilution because “the capacity of
[Playboy Enterprises] to identify its goods and services was
diminished . . . .”26 In particular, AsiaFocus’s “purposeful tactic of
embedding the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden
computer source code . . . epitomizes [AsiaFocus’s] ‘blurring’ of [Playboy
Enterprises’] trademarks.”27 In addition, the court found that “[t]he
accessibility of the infringing Web sites, the defendants’ successful
number of hits, and the blatant display of [Playboy Enterprises’]
trademarks are all factors that compound [Playboy Enterprises’]
damage.”28 Thus, the court found that AsiaFocus’s conduct in this case
warranted the award of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and
consequently awarded $3 million based on the maximum of $100,000
per mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed.29
Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.30 provides the first
instance in which a defendant was preliminarily enjoined from using
metatags comprising of the plaintiff’s trade name, as well as terms
relevant only to the plaintiff’s business.31 The parties in this case were
competitors in the specialized market of manufacturing x-ray
fluorescence (XRF) instruments that detect the presence of lead in paint.
Niton initially filed suit against Radiation Monitoring Devices (RMD)
for using false and misleading statements in advertising and marketing
its own product, including statements on RMD’s Web site that included
the Niton trade name.32 Thereafter, Niton discovered that many of the
metatags on RMD’s site were identical to those used on Niton’s Web

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *21–22.
Id. at *22.
27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 103–04.
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site.33 Specifically, the only metatag on five Web pages of RMD’s site
was “The Home Page of Niton Corporation, makers of the finest lead,
radon and multi-element detectors.”34 In addition, several metatags
included keywords, such as “radon,” that were relevant to products sold
by Niton but not by RMD.35
While declining to define the nature of the defendant’s conduct as
trademark infringement, dilution, or unfair competition, the court found
that Niton was likely to prevail on “its contention that RMD’s Internet
Web sites and means of attracting users . . . have been used by RMD in a
way likely to lead users to believe” that RMD was also known as or
affiliated with Niton Corporation or made Niton products, and that RMD
Web sites were Niton Web sites.36 The injunction appeared to be based
on the nature of RMD’s actions, which the court characterized as
“deceptive and immediately harmful,”37 instead of a showing of
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
2. Initial Interest Confusion
While the Niton case highlights the difficulty in categorizing the use
of another’s trademarks in metatags as trademark infringement,
dilution, unfair competition, or some other legal doctrine, Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment38 directly confronts
this issue. This case is also significant because it is the first to analyze
the use of another’s trademark or trade name as a metatag alone and not
in the context of other improper uses of that trademark or trade name,
such as in the text of the Web site or as part of a domain name. While
search engines listed the defendant’s Web site along with that of the
plaintiff, the defendant used a domain name and identifying information
on its Web site that would distinguish itself from the plaintiff.
Brookfield relied upon the doctrine of initial interest confusion. This
doctrine imposes liability even where circumstances mitigate any
consumer confusion before goods are sold or services are rendered.
Instead, initial interest confusion recognizes exactly what is wrong with
using another’s trademark in a metatag—capitalizing on the trademark
holder’s goodwill to divert consumers from the trademark holder’s site
to one’s own site.
Brookfield Communications (Brookfield) and West Coast Entertainment
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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(West Coast) started out in related but noncompetitive fields, but became
competitors as both sought to expand their businesses into e-commerce.
Brookfield began using the mark “moviebuff” in December 1993 in
connection with software featuring searchable databases containing
information related to and intended exclusively for the entertainment
industry. Brookfield began offering a scaled-down version of the
software to consumers in 1994, made the product available through its
Web site, brookfieldcomm.com, in 1996, and registered the mark for
these goods and related services in September 1998.39
West Coast was one of the nation’s largest video rental store chains.
It owned the service mark, “the movie buff’s movie store” and used the
term “movie buff” as part of various phrases to promote goods and
services available at its video stores.40 West Coast registered the domain
name “moviebuff.com” with Network Solutions in February 1996,
although it conducted no business activity at this address.41 In October
1998, West Coast announced its intention to launch a Web site at this
address that would include searchable databases related to movies
intended for prospective video purchasers.42 The district court denied a
temporary restraining order sought by Brookfield enjoining West Coast
from, among other things, using the mark “moviebuff” as a domain
name and “in buried code or metatags on their home page or Web
pages.”43
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, first disposing
of the domain name issue by finding a likelihood of confusion by West
Coast’s use and registration of the domain name “moviebuff.com.”44 The
court then turned to the question of West Coast’s use of moviebuff as a
metatag “at any other domain address other than ‘moviebuff.com’
(which we have determined that West Coast may not use).”45 This
question specifically addressed West Coast’s use of moviebuff as a
metatag at West Coast’s other Web site, westcoastvideo.com.
The court recognized that West Coast’s use of the term “moviebuff” in
its metatags meant that a search for moviebuff would bring up a list

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1041–42.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1045–60.
Id. at 1062.
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including westcoastvideo.com.46 However, the resulting confusion
would not be as great as if West Coast used the moviebuff.com domain
name.47 Confusion was reduced because the search results page would
display both West Coast’s and Brookfield’s sites so that the user would
be able to scan the list and find the particular site being sought.48
Moreover, should the user choose the westcoastvideo.com site, confusion
would not be likely because the site had a distinct domain name and
prominently displayed the “West Coast” name on its home page.49
Instead, the court based West Coast’s liability for use of moviebuff in
its metatags on initial interest confusion, finding that “use of another’s
trademark in a manner calculated to ‘capture initial consumer attention,
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
confusion, may be still an infringement.’”50 Although Web surfers
looking for Brookfield’s moviebuff products and taken by a search
engine to westcoastvideo.com would not be confused as to the source of
the site, at least some of those consumers may simply utilize West
Coast’s offerings rather than going through the trouble of backtracking
to Brookfield’s site because the two companies offer such similar
services. By using Brookfield’s trademarks to initially attract the
interest of consumers looking for moviebuff products, and to ultimately
divert them to its own Web site, West Coast misappropriated and rode
on the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark. The court
analogized West Coast’s use of Brookfield’s trademark as a metatag to a
situation wherein a competitor of West Coast, say Blockbuster, posts a
billboard on the highway reading “West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at
Exit 7” and West Coast is actually located at exit eight while
Blockbuster is at exit seven.51 The unwitting consumer looking for West
Coast’s store takes exit seven, but finds Blockbuster instead, and could
decide to rent a video there instead of continuing to search for West

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1405 (9th Cir. 1997); citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,
257–60 (2d Cir. 1987)). In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., the Second
Circuit held that Pegasus Petroleum’s use of Pegasus was infringement of Mobil’s
trademark, a flying horse symbol in the form of the Greek mythological creature
Pegasus. Even though Mobil acknowledged that potential consumers would typically
realize that Pegasus Petroleum was unrelated to Mobil before consummating an actual
sale, “potential purchasers would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum”
by at least preliminarily thinking that Pegasus Petroleum was associated with Mobil.
Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 260.
51. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064.
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Coast.52 The fact that customers are not confused because they are fully
aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster does not diminish the
effect of initial interest confusion; in this case it would allow
Blockbuster to divert consumers by misappropriating West Coast’s
acquired goodwill.53
However, the court distinguished between West Coast’s improper use
of moviebuff in its metatags from its legitimate use of the term “movie
buff” as a metatag. The latter use is permitted as fair use because
“movie buff” is a descriptive term routinely used in the English language
to describe a movie devotee.54 “Even though [moviebuff] differs from
‘Movie Buff’ by a single space, that difference is pivotal.”55
3. Limitations on Protection of Trademarks as Metatags
Brookfield suggests one limitation on the protection of trademarks as
metatags: terms and trademarks should remain available for others to
legitimately use as metatags—to describe or refer in good faith to the
content of their sites. This limitation corresponds to the fair use defense
for trademark infringement, which protects a party using trademarks
“fairly and in good faith to describe to users the goods or services” of
such party, or their geographic origin.56 “The ‘fair use’ defense, in
essence, forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term
for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a
characteristic of their goods.”57
Playboy Enterprises v. Welles58 bucked the trend of cases prohibiting
the use of another’s trademarks as metatags by finding that the defendant
used Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks in good faith.59 The defendant in
this case, Terri Welles, was awarded the playmate of the year title in
1981. Since that time, Ms. Welles appeared in thirteen issues of Playboy
magazine and eighteen newsstand specials. Ms. Welles claimed that
since 1980, she had always referred to herself as a “playmate” or
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1066.
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
57. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980)).
58. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d without opinion, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th
Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 1104.
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“playmate of the year,” with Playboy Enterprises’ knowledge.60
Ms. Welles operated a Web site, terriwelles.com, featuring adult photo
collections of herself and others. Eleven of the fifteen pages of the Web
site included statements, in varying font sizes, which disclaimed the
site’s sponsorship or endorsement by, or association with, Playboy
Enterprises.61 The Web site activity that Playboy Enterprises sought to
enjoin on the grounds of trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair
competition, involved: (1) Ms. Welles’s use of the mark, “playmate of
the year” in the title of her home page and link page; (2) cyberstuffing
the background of her Web pages with the barely visible watermark
“PMOY ’81” (an abbreviation for playmate of the year 1981); and (3)
using the trademarks “playboy” and “playmate” as metatags.62
The court denied Playboy Enterprises’ motion for a preliminary
injunction on its claims of trademark infringement and dilution.63 Ms.
Welles’s visual uses of Playboy Enterprises’ marks were in good faith
and constituted fair uses because “the trademarks that defendant uses,
and the manner in which she uses them, describe her and identify her.”64
In addition, the court recognized that Playboy Enterprises did not
contractually restrict, and typically encouraged, playmates to use their
titles for self-promotion and for the promotion of the company, such as
using these terms in the title of an autobiography.65 Playboy Enterprises
contended that permitting these uses of the playmate title did not allow
Ms. Welles to trade on Playboy Enterprises’ marks so as to compete
with Playboy Enterprises. However, the court found that Ms. Welles’s
uses of Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks, the inclusion of disclaimers, as
well as other good faith factors—not using Playboy Enterprises’ famous
bunny logo or incorporating a Playboy Enterprises mark as part of her
domain name—indicated that the “defendant is selling Terri Welles and
only Terri Welles on the Web site. There is no overt attempt to confuse
the websurfer into believing that her site is a Playboy-related site.”66
Absent was any discussion of Ms. Welles’s good faith in using Playboy
Enterprises’ mark to cyberstuff her Web pages with the barely visible
PMOY ’81 mark.
With respect to Ms. Welles’s invisible use of Playboy Enterprises’
trademarks as metatags, the court similarly found no trademark
infringement and dilution because the marks were used “in good faith to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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index the content of Welles’s Web site.”67 Analogizing metatags to the
subject index of a card catalog, in that both give researchers—whether
human or computerized—a clearer indication of the content of what they
search, the court found that Playboy Enterprises’ marks as metatags
merely referenced the legitimate editorial uses of the terms in the text of
Ms. Welles’s Web site.68
4. The Boundaries of Fair Use and Initial Interest Confusion
The decision in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles does not mean that use
of another’s trademark in metatags will automatically be protected as
fair use as long as the trademark refers to some aspect of the Web site.
The boundary of fair use has been explored where the defendant has
claimed that its use of another’s trademark in metatags is legitimate
because its Web site refers to commentary or criticism about the
trademark holder. Ultimately, the standard of good faith defines this
boundary. The good faith standard is determined by factors such as
whether the defendant offers goods or services in competition with the
trademark owner, the frequency that the defendant uses the trademark in
metatags, and whether the defendant engages in any other practices that
cause search engines to prioritize the defendant’s site in its search
results.
In the recent case of J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel69 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California refused to apply the fair use
doctrine to allow uses of another’s mark that unfairly manipulated search
engines, and found that these uses diverted consumers away from the
plaintiff’s services.70 The parties were competitors in the field of tax
representation and negotiation—representing clients to eliminate or
reduce their assessed tax liability and negotiate favorable terms. J.K.
Harris advertised its services at jkharris.com, while Kassel used the Web
site, taxes.com, to advertise its competing services and to criticize and
publish unfavorable statements about J.K. Harris.
J.K. Harris sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Kassel from
certain manipulative practices in connection with its taxes.com Web site
that caused search engines to list the taxes.com site along with the
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
2002 WL 1303124, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2002).
Id. at *6.
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jkharris.com site in their search results pages.71 Specifically, J.K. Harris
alleged that this was done by “creating keyword density”—using the
J.K. Harris trade name excessively throughout the taxes.com Web site.72
In addition, Kassel increased the font size and underlined sentences
containing the J.K. Harris trade name, and placed these sentences at the
top of several Web pages.73 In so doing, Kassel repetitively used the
J.K. Harris trade name in its header and underline tags.74 Finally, Kassel
used the J.K. Harris trade name as part of links to sites with information
about J.K. Harris.75 Thus, by repeatedly using the J.K. Harris trade
name throughout the text and HTML tags of the taxes.com site, Kassel
guaranteed that search engines would find and prioritize the taxes.com
site upon a search for “J.K. Harris” because engines search text and tags
for keywords matching requested search terms. According to J.K.
Harris, the result of this conduct was that Web users who conducted a
search for “J.K. Harris” were simultaneously given a chance to visit the
taxes.com site.76 In fact, most search engines returned a link to taxes.com
under the title “complaints about JK Harris pile up” among the first ten
links.77 According to J.K. Harris, these practices constituted trade name
infringement pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act78 because they
created initial interest confusion among consumers looking for J.K.
Harris’s services.79
Before reaching the issue of initial interest confusion, the court
considered whether Kassel’s uses of the J.K. Harris trade name could
constitute “nominative fair use” because, according to Kassel, these uses
were necessary to warn consumers about allegedly harmful business
practices.80 The court applied a three factor test from an earlier Ninth
Circuit case81 in order to determine when an unauthorized use of a
trademark is permissible: (1) the product or service in question is not
71. Id. at *1–2.
72. Id. at *1. Creating keyword density is a form of cyberstuffing. See supra note 14.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *1. Header and underline tags are types of HTML tags that provide
display instructions to the Web browser opening the file that contains the Web site in
question. While header and underline tags are not solely intended to provide indexing
information to search engines, like keyword and description metatags, some search
engines do read these tags and use them in determining how high to rank a site.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *4.
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
79. Id. at *2, *4. J.K. Harris also based its request for injunctive relief on alleged
violations of state laws prohibiting unfair competition and false and misleading
advertising. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *4.
81. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992).
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readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the
mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service; and (3) the mark is not used in any manner that would suggest
sponsorship or endorsement of the trademark owner.82
Under this three part test, J.K. Harris’s request to enjoin all of Kassel’s
uses of its trade name was overly broad.83 The uses of the trade name in
links to Web pages about the plaintiff and dissemination of truthful
factual information, even if critical, was nominative fair use.84
However, Kassel’s other uses of the trade name did not satisfy the
second factor of the fair use test because they were not reasonably
necessary to identify the product or services.85 Specifically, the court
found that Kassel did not need to underline and otherwise emphasize
sentences containing the J.K. Harris trade name, nor did they need to use
the trade name as a header or underline tags.86 Further, it was not
necessary to use the trade name and permutations thereof seventy-five
different times through the Web site in order to identify J.K. Harris’s
services.87 Unlike the decision in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles,88 these
uses were not fair because the metatags listed the trade name so
repeatedly that they functioned to manipulate the result of search engines
instead of merely indexing the content of the site.
The court also enjoined these unauthorized uses as likely to cause
initial interest confusion among consumers because the services
provided by the parties were competitive, and the design of Kassel’s
Web site indicated that Kassel intended to induce consumer confusion.89
Thus, the court agreed with J.K. Harris that potential customers might be
diverted to Kassel’s services.90 While consumers would not believe
that J.K. Harris was the sponsor of the negative publicity on the
taxes.com site, they might choose to investigate these charges before
visiting J.K. Harris’s services.91 Consumers might then decide to secure
tax representation services from Kassel, instead of J.K. Harris, because of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

J.K. Harris, 2002 WL 1303124, at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (1998).
J.K. Harris, 2002 WL 1303124, at *6.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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the negative comments, or simply because the services offered by both
were sufficiently similar that they would not bother to find J.K. Harris’s
site.92
In contrast, courts may be less likely to find initial interest confusion
and more likely to apply the fair use doctrine where the parties are not
competitors. In Bihari v. Gross,93 the plaintiffs, Bihari and Bihari
Interiors (Bihari), sought to preliminarily enjoin the defendants Craig
Gross and Yolanda Trublio (Gross) from using the trademark “Bihari
Interiors” as a metatag in the defendants’ Web sites.94 Bihari had
provided interior design services in connection with the Bihari and Bihari
Interiors trade names since 1989; Gross was a former client of Bihari
Interiors who was less than satisfied with the relationship.95 Gross used
the Web sites designscam.com and manhattaninteriordesign.com to
criticize Bihari. The home page of each Web site began with a caption
reading “The Real Story Behind Marianne Bihari & Bihari Interiors.”96
Also included on the Web sites were numerous links to third party sites,
many of which offered interior design services competitive with those of
Bihari.97 Bihari moved for an injunction for trademark infringement
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.98
The District Court for the Southern District of New York easily
disposed of the issue of likelihood of confusion because the Gross Web
sites did not sell any goods or provide services competitive with Bihari
Interiors.99 Moreover, because the critical nature of the Web sites was
evident from the first pages of the sites, no reasonable Web user would
believe that the negative comments about Bihari were sponsored by or
associated with Bihari.100
The court also found that Bihari failed to prove a likelihood of initial
interest confusion because Gross’s use of the Bihari Interiors mark as a
metatag was not a bad faith attempt to trick users into visiting his Web
sites.101 The basis of this conclusion must have been the fact that Bihari
and Gross were not competitors. “[T]he Gross websites cannot divert
Internet users away from Bihari’s websites because Bihari does not have
a competing website.”102 According to the court, the unauthorized use of
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 319.
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the Bihari Interiors mark brought users to sites that provided Web users
with information about Bihari, albeit negative, rather than diverting
users from Bihari.103
Finally, the court found that even if the Gross Web sites caused
consumer confusion, use of the Bihari Interiors mark in the metatags was
protected fair use because it was used in its descriptive sense as an index
or catalog.104 That is, Gross included Bihari Interiors in the metatags of
his Web sites simply because the sites provide information about Bihari
Interiors and Marianne Bihari.105 Moreover, use of this mark as a
metatag was the only way Gross “can get his message to the public”
because prohibiting such use might foreclose access to Gross’s
commentary.106 “Courts must be particularly cautious of overextending
the reach of the Lanham Act and intruding on First Amendment
values.”107 In addition, the court found that a finding of fair use was
appropriate because Gross acted in “good faith.”108 Gross chose domain
names that did not incorporate Bihari’s trade name or trademark and
included the disclaimer: “Keep in mind that this site reflects only the
viewpoint and experiences of one Manhattan couple.”109
Although the facts of the Bihari case are similar to the facts of the J.K.
Harris case, there are two key differences that account for the different
outcomes of each case. First and foremost, the J.K. Harris defendant was
a competitor of the plaintiff, while the Bihari defendant was not. The
defendant in the J.K. Harris case used the site at issue to criticize the
plaintiff and to advertise and offer competing services, while the
defendant in the Bihari case ostensibly used the site only to provide
negative commentary about the plaintiff. Consequently, the J.K. Harris
court found that the defendant’s site diverted consumers away from the
plaintiff and ultimately led to initial interest confusion, while the Bihari
court did not. Second, the J.K. Harris defendant used the mark in dispute
in header and underline tags, which are intended to provide instructions to
a Web browser about display effects—in this case, where to display
headers and underlining—while the mark in the Bihari case was used as a
metatag, which functions only to describe the content of the Web site.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 323–24.
Id.
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This practice, along with the excessive use of the J.K. Harris trade name
throughout the site, evidenced Kassel’s bad faith and intent to divert
consumers from J.K. Harris’s site and at least initially induce confusion.
III. KEYWORDS
A. The Technology: What Is a Keyword?
Online advertisers seek to optimize the effectiveness of their
advertisements by targeting particular consumers. The desire to market
to specialized consumers in e-commerce has led many of the large
search engines to sell search terms, or keywords, to advertisers. The
operators of these search engines program their servers to link banner
advertisements to the purchased keyword. As a result, when an Internet
user types a particular word into a search engine, the advertisement of
the company that has bought this word from the search engine will
appear as a banner advertisement along with the search results page,
usually at the top.
Unfortunately for most trademark holders, this ostensibly innocuous
practice has developed into what some regard as a new form of cyber
piracy. Search engines sell others’ trademarks as keywords, often to
competitors of the trademark holder.110 As a result, the purchaser uses that
trademark to trigger its advertising without having to compensate the
trademark holder for the value and goodwill that led Web surfers to search
for that mark in the first place. The predatory nature of this use becomes
particularly apparent when compared to practices in the traditional
advertising context, where advertisers pay magazines or networks to use
their name, reputation, and the attractiveness of their content to sell the
advertisers’ products.111 Moreover, banner advertisements typically
contain clickable hyperlinks to the advertisers’ own Web sites, which
facilitates diversion of traffic away from the Web site associated with the
trademark holder.
B. Legal Issues
The sale and purchase of keywords involves many of the same legal
questions raised by using another’s trademark in metatags. Does this
practice “use” a trademark in commerce in connection with any goods or
services that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception, as
110. See Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Using Others’ Trademarks to
Trigger Internet Advertisements, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1999, at 3.
111. See Dale M. Cendali et al., An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues
Relating to the Internet, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 485, 539–40 (1999).
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required by the Lanham Act?112 Is the sale or purchase of a trademark as
a keyword a use at all? The answer depends in large part on whether the
accused use involves the sale of a trademark by a search engine or the
purchase of a trademark by an advertiser. The former is more difficult to
categorize as a proper use because the services provided by the search
engine are typically not competitive with the goods or services of the
trademark holder. However, the purchase of a trademark by a
competitor of the trademark holder could qualify as use “in the sale or
advertising of services,” as required by the Lanham Act’s definition of
“use in commerce” on services,113 and may be likely to cause confusion,
mistake, or deception.
Moreover, given the context of the Internet and the savvy of many
Internet users, is the appearance of banner advertisements at the top of
search results pages likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as
to the association or affiliation between the advertiser and the trademark
holder? Such confusion or mistake is more likely to occur where the
advertiser and the trademark holder offer competing goods or services
and the advertiser uses a banner advertisement that does not identify the
source of the advertising. However, even if the advertiser does identify
itself in a manner that minimizes confusion, is the advertiser engaging in
unfair competition by free riding off the recognition and goodwill of the
trademark? After all, without the goodwill associated with the
purchased trademark, its banner advertising would never have been
triggered in response to a search for that trademark. On its face, this
practice may appear to be akin to grocery store cash registers that
generate a coupon for, say, Pampers diapers upon the purchase of
Huggies diapers. The crucial difference is that Pampers’s “advertising”
does not appear until after the purchase of the Huggies diapers and does
not divert consumers from their intended purchases. In contrast, banner
advertising appears before the Internet user can even link to the site that
it seeks. Further, banner ads may be displayed in a manner that makes
the Internet user’s search more difficult by occupying a large part of the
search results page and thereby obscuring the trademark holder’s site.
The only judicial decision on the use of trademarks as keywords,
Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications Corp.,114 has left
some of these issues unanswered. However, the decision does provide
112.
113.
114.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000).
Id. § 1127.
55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
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some guidelines that trademark holders should follow in asserting their
trademark rights to prohibit the selling and purchasing of trademarks as
keywords.
C. The Playboy Enterprises Decision
Playboy Enterprises sued two operators of one of the Internet’s most
popular search engines, excite.com, to prohibit them from generating
hard core porn banner advertisements when Web surfers searched for the
terms “playboy” and “playmate.”115 The defendants (Excite) sold a
package of over 450 words to operators of hard core adult entertainment
sites, including the words “playboy” and “playmate.”116 Playboy
Enterprises sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds of trademark
infringement and dilution for (1) marketing and selling the package of
words to Playboy Enterprises’ competitors in the adult entertainment
field; (2) programming, or “keying,” the banner ads to run in response to
the search terms “playboy” and “playmate;” and (3) actually displaying
the hard core banner advertisements on the search results page.117 As a
result, Playboy Enterprises contended that Internet users were diverted
away from its official Web site and Web sites sponsored or approved by
Playboy Enterprises to other competitive adult entertainment sites.118
The banner advertisements, while animated and designed to entice the
Internet user to “click here,” did not contain any information about the
advertiser,119 a practice that is arguably more likely to confuse the
consumer into thinking that the advertisement is associated with Playboy
Enterprises. Excite responded that it did not use Playboy Enterprises’
trademarks as trademarks.120
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
agreed with Excite, holding that Playboy Enterprises failed to show that
Excite used the terms “playboy” and “playmate” in their trademark form
instead of in their ordinary, descriptive connotations.121 Playboy and
playmate are, in addition to trademarks owned by Playboy Enterprises,
English words in their own right.122 Internet users cannot conduct
searches using the trademark form of the words—playboy® and
playmate®.123 “Thus, whether the user is looking for goods and services
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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covered by [Playboy Enterprises’] trademarks or something altogether
unrelated to [Playboy Enterprises] is anybody’s guess.”124
The court proceeded to hold that even if the words “playboy” and
“playmate” were used as trademarks, Playboy Enterprises failed to show
that confusion was likely to result from that use.125 Focusing again on
the fact that the trademarks at issue were English words in their own
right, the court refused to allow a trademark holder to remove a word
from the English language merely by acquiring its trademark rights.126
Moreover, the initial interest confusion theory applied in the Internet
context by the Brookfield Communications case was rejected in this
context because, unlike the parties in Brookfield, Excite and Playboy
Enterprises were not competitors.127 As a result, Excite’s activities did
not capture Internet users looking for Playboy Enterprises’ site in the
same way that West Coast’s use of Brookfield’s trademarks as
metatags did.128 In contrast to the analogy set forth in Brookfield
Communications, the court provided this analogy for the selling of
trademarks:
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in
response to a sign that reads ‘Fast Food Burgers’ to find a well-known fast food
burger restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads: ‘Better Burgers: 1
Block Further.’ The driver, previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from
the well-known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore other burger
options. Assuming that the same entity owns the land on which both the burger
restaurant and the competitor’s billboard stand, should that entity be liable to
the burger restaurant for diverting the driver?129

The court’s reasoning, and particularly its refusal to answer this
question in the affirmative, implies that Playboy Enterprises may have
named the wrong defendants. Excite is not a competitor of Playboy
Enterprises, nor does Excite use Playboy Enterprises’ marks (assuming
that the terms are used in their trademark forms) “in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion” as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1114.130 While Excite may have
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1074–75.
126. Id. at 1074.
127. Id. at 1074–75.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1075.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (relating to registered trademarks, such as the playboy
and playmate marks).
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marketed and sold the words “playboy” and “playmate” and programmed
banner ads to appear in response to search requests for these terms, these
activities are certainly not what is typically understood to be use in
commerce in connection with goods or services confusingly similar to
Playboy Enterprises’ use. Instead, the purchasers of the terms
“playboy” and “playmate” may have been more appropriate defendants
because they were competitors of Playboy Enterprises and, arguably,
used the terms in connection with their adult entertainment services in a
way that was likely to cause confusion with Playboy Enterprises’
services. Thus, the court may have found that the terms “playboy” and
“playmate” were being used as trademarks instead of common English
words if the purchasers used the terms because they were direct
competitors of Playboy Enterprises.
Predictably, the court also found, for all the reasons set forth above,
that Excite’s activities did not dilute by blurring or tarnishing Playboy
Enterprises’ marks.131 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction without opinion.132
Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications Corp. appears to
suggest some strategies for trademark holders that object to the sale of
their trademarks as keywords. First, claims may be more likely to stand
against the purchase of trademarks by advertisers that offer competing
goods or services rather than against the sale of these trademarks by
search engines. Secondly, an arbitrary or fanciful mark that has no other
meaning in the English language may be more successful than a
suggestive or descriptive mark.
IV. HYPERLINKING
A. The Technology: What Is a “Link”?
Hypertext links, or “links” for short, allow users to move to another
Web site or to another part of the current site without having to type
complicated URL addresses.133 In fact, hyperlinking created and defined
the Web—the graphical, linkable portion of the Internet.134 A link
typically appears on a Web page as an underlined and highlighted URL
address or as a graphic, which may or may not incorporate the trademark
or other designation identifying the linked site.
131. Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1087–89.
132. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
133. Emily Madoff, Freedom to Link Under Attack: Web Community Up in Arms
over Lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1997, at S1.
134. Martin J. Elgison & James M. Jordan III, Trademark Cases Arise from MetaTags, Frames, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C6.

362

PRINTERALBERTANDABBATI.DOC

[VOL. 40: 341, 2003]

1/30/2020 10:19 AM

Metatags, Keywords, and Links
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The main advantage of linking is convenience. Links make the Internet
a powerful resource that provides its users with an interconnected world
of knowledge, all made possible by the ability to link information
available on one site to other sites. However, trademark holders have
objected to this practice and have asserted trademark infringement and
unfair competition in two different linking scenarios.
In the first, a site links to the trademark holder’s Web site, or the
“linked site,” which may cause a blurring in the distinction between the
proprietary material of the linking site and that of the linked site. That
is, the link may provoke a mistaken belief that the linking site is
affiliated or associated with the linked site, in violation of section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.135 The link also may lead to a dilution claim under
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act,136 particularly because frequent linking
may diminish the ability of a famous mark on the linked site to identify
goods and services associated with that mark. Particularly problematic
are “deep links,” which connect the linking site to a subsidiary page of
the linked site. These links bypass the home page of the linked site,
which typically set forth its trademarks, logos, and other identifying
information. As such, deep links are even more likely to mislead users
into thinking that the two sites are associated or affiliated. Moreover,
bypassing the home page also typically means skipping the advertising
sold by the linked site, which is often its main source of income.
Advertisers pay a premium for advertisements placed on the home page
of Web sites, and the value of advertising space on a home page depends
greatly on the volume of hits it receives.
In the second scenario, the link incorporates a trademark (or a
confusingly similar term) in its domain name to operate a site that appears
to be noncommercial and noncompeting. The noncommercial nature of
these sites would ordinarily insulate them from trademark infringement
liability because there is no use in commerce. However, if these sites link
away from the trademark holder’s site to third parties’ sites, these links
may make the sites commercial and may create a likelihood of confusion,
or otherwise unfairly compete, with the trademark holder’s site.
1. Linking to a Trademark Holder’s Site
The following cases exemplify the objections of owners of linked sites
135.
136.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
Id. § 1125(c).

363

PRINTERALBERTANDABBATI.DOC

1/30/2020 10:19 AM

against unauthorized links to their sites. Trademark infringement and
unfair competition have turned out to be suitable causes of action for
such unauthorized linking because the facts of each case indicate that the
defendants were not trying to pass themselves off as the plaintiffs.
Instead, the defendants’ primary wrong was to operate parasitic sites that
lifted content from others’ sites, often in great volume, and sold
advertising and attracted users based on unauthorized uses of that
content. Thus, the defendants took for free material that cost the owners
of the linked sites significant expenses, resources, and time to create and
organize. As such, the defendants deprived the linked sites of
advertising dollars and users to which they were arguably entitled. This
type of wrong may be best characterized as misappropriation, which is
catchall common law tort that recognizes the investment involved in
creating a product, service, or business and protects against unauthorized
taking or free riding off of that value. Courts, however, have addressed
this wrong as copyright infringement137 and trespass to personal
property. The linking cases discussed below have been selected because
the plaintiffs asserted claims for trademark infringement and unfair
competition, even though the cases were ultimately decided on other
nontrademark grounds.
Ticketmaster filed suit against Tickets.com,138 another online
company that provided entertainment, sports, and travel tickets, event
information, and related products and services. Tickets.com operated like
a clearinghouse by directing users to tickets wherever they are available,
including other ticketing agents on the Web, such as Ticketmaster.
However, Tickets.com also had exclusive relationships with 4000
venues, providing them with ticketing software and distribution services,
and earned commissions for directly selling the tickets for those
venues.139
Ticketmaster’s complaint alleged both copyright infringement and
unfair competition for providing deep links into Ticketmaster’s site,
bypassing introductory pages, and advertising on Ticketmaster’s home

137. In fact, the first written judicial opinion inquiring into potential liability for
deep linking was based exclusively on principles of copyright infringement and, in part,
addressed whether Web site operators linking to another’s site, which displayed
plagiarized texts of the Mormon Church, could be held liable for contributory
infringement. Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah
1999).
138. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1887522, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2000).
139. See Bob Tedeschi, Ticketmaster Sues Again over Links, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1999, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/08/cyber/articles/
10tickets.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
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page.140 Because Ticketmaster generated revenue by selling advertising
on its home pages, the practice of deep linking diminished the value of
those pages.141 Ticketmaster did allow other sites, such as Yahoo and
Knight-Ridder, to maintain deep links into its site, but only pursuant to
terms agreed upon by the parties.142 In addition, Ticketmaster claimed
that, in order to earn its commissions, Tickets.com falsely stated that
tickets for certain events were not available through online ticketing
sources, including Ticketmaster, other than the ticket brokers with whom
Tickets.com had relationships.143 Ticketmaster’s suit also included
copyright infringement claims directed to Tickets.com’s purported
unauthorized downloading and reproduction of material from
Ticketmaster’s site, such as events listings.144
The District Court for the Central District of California dismissed four
of Ticketmaster’s counts against Tickets.com and set forth guidelines by
which Ticketmaster had to prove its case.145 In so doing, the court voiced
support for the practice of hyperlinking, stating that hyperlinking does not
itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act because no copying is
involved.146 However, the court refused to dismiss the copyright
infringement claim because Ticketmaster did allege copying to the extent
that it contended Tickets.com copied its interior Web pages in order to
extract factual information, such as event, place, time, date, and price.147
The court also refused to dismiss Ticketmaster’s claims for federal
unfair competition, false advertising, state unfair business practices, and
interference with business advantage.148 However, Tickets.com was not

Id.

140. Id.
141. Id.
On some Web sites, advertising space deep inside a site is more valuable,
because it lets advertisers reach an audience with a specific interest. On
ticketing sites, however . . . [a] home page seen by entertainment fans in great
numbers is likely to be more valuable to an advertiser than, say, a page selling
tickets for a Marilyn Manson concert.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 525390, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 2000).
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. However, the court ultimately refused to grant a preliminary injunction on
the copyright aspects of this case as “fair use” reverse engineering. Ticketmaster v.
Tickets.com, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
148. Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390, at *1.
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preliminarily enjoined under these theories because Tickets.com did not
pass itself off as Ticketmaster and, therefore, the customer was not
misled.149 Tickets.com accompanied its link with clear statements that it
did not sell the tickets itself, but would refer the customer to another
broker.150 The customer ended up on the Ticketmaster home page filled
with Ticketmaster logos.151
The online auction site eBay joined the fray by filing suit against
Bidders’ Edge,152 an online auction comparison site that functioned as a
one stop shop for auction hunters by indexing, organizing, and linking to
listings on major auction Web sites, including eBay’s site. Bidders’ Edge
was able to do this by using two common Internet tools. “Robots” and
“spiders” are programs that automatically search auction hosts like eBay
for the latest posted auctions on a particular item and assemble a database
of retrieved information so that users can compare various auctions.
Then, users can directly deep link to the page on the host site that features
the desired auction. While eBay ultimately ends up making money from
Bidders’ Edge customers, eBay claimed that Bidders’ Edge was engaging
in unfair competition because it profited off the success of eBay, which
the company spent millions of dollars developing.153
Included in eBay’s nine-count complaint were allegations for trespass to
personal property because Bidders’ Edge “used, accessed and intermeddled
with and continues to use, access and intermeddle with eBay’s computer
systems for defendant’s own commercial benefit.”154 eBay also alleged that
Bidders’ Edge’s deep links into eBay’s site constituted unfair business
practices, copyright infringement, misappropriation, and interference with
prospective economic advantage.155 Bidders’ Edge also allegedly infringed
and diluted the eBay mark by repeatedly displaying the mark in its auction
listings, and engaged in false advertising by representing that eBay had a
smaller proportionate share of the relevant auctions than it actually did.156
The District Court for the Northern District of California preliminarily
enjoined Bidders’ Edge from accessing eBay’s computer system by its
robot or the use of “any automated querying program” on the ground of
trespass to eBay’s proprietary computer system.157

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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See Debra Baker, Bid for Fair Practice, 86 A.B.A.J. 22 (2000).
eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
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2. Linking as a Basis of Commercial Use of a Mark
Trademark infringement and dilution claims have also been raised
where the defendant’s Web site was clearly not competitive with the
plaintiff’s business, such as sites that criticize or parody the plaintiff’s
business. Trademark infringement claims often founder on the issue of
whether such sites use a mark “in commerce . . . in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising” of goods or
services.158 Moreover, challenging these sites under federal trademark
dilution grounds requires proof that the sites make commercial use of the
marks in dispute.159 Using a Web site for criticism or parody does not
typically constitute commercial activity; but can linking to other sites
establish the threshold commercial use requirement? The answer
depends on the commercial nature of the linked sites. If so, can these
links change the nature of a criticism or parody site that does not appear
to compete with the plaintiff? The answer depends on whether the
linked sites offer goods or services that are competing with those of the
plaintiff.
The defendant in OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc.160 was found
liable for trademark infringement and dilution for, in part, linking away
from the plaintiff’s Web site and to another Web site that advertised
competing products.161 The plaintiff, OBH, Inc., owned the Buffalo
News, the daily newspaper of Buffalo, New York, which included an
advertising periodical called Apartment Finder.162 OBH had owned a
registration for the mark “The Buffalo News” since 1980.163
Defendant Tortora was the president of the Apartment Spotlight
Magazine, which advertised available apartments in Buffalo and the
surrounding areas.164 One online version of this magazine was published
at buffalonyapartments.com.165 In April 1999, Tortora registered the
domain name “thebuffalonews.com,” and began operating a site at that
The site opened with the greeting “Welcome to
address.166
www.thebuffalonews.com,” followed by a statement disclaiming
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
Id. § 1125(c).
86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 185–98.
Id. at 181–82.
Id at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182.
Id.
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affiliation with or endorsement by the Buffalo News and specifying that
the site was intended only for parody and criticism of the Buffalo
News.167 The site contained hyperlinks to other Web pages containing
negative opinions and stories about the newspaper, as well as to other
news-related Web sites, including local news competitors of the Buffalo
News.168 The site also included a link to another of Tortora’s sites,
buffalonyapartments.com, which advertised apartments for rent.169 It
appears that the links in this case were not deep links, but links to surface
pages of other news-related sites and buffalonyapartments.com.170
The defendants argued that, as a threshold matter, their use of the
plaintiff’s mark did not constitute “use in commerce . . . in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion . . . .”171 The defendants’ site located at the address containing
the plaintiff’s mark “The Buffalo News” did not itself offer or sell goods
or services competitive with OBH and was not even commercial in
nature.172 In addition to use of a domain name confusingly similar to
OBH’s registered trademark, the District Court for the Western District
of New York found that the use in commerce requirement was satisfied
because the site included a link to Tortora’s other Web site,
buffalonyapartments.com.173 This linked site, featuring an online
version of Tortora’s Apartment Spotlight Magazine, was operated for a
primarily commercial purpose.174 This link to Tortora’s online magazine
also established that the defendants were using the OBH mark “at least
in part, to offer their own services over the Internet.”175 That the linked
online publication directly competed with OBH’s online publication
factored into the court’s conclusion that a likelihood of confusion existed
because “such a high degree of proximity” between Tortora’s originating
site and the linked site also operated by Tortora “increases the likelihood
of confusion among Internet users.”176
Moreover, observing that infringing use of another’s mark “in
connection with goods or services” may also be in connection with the
goods or services offered or distributed by the trademark holder, the
court found that the links potentially diverted site users who had
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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mistakenly arrived at Tortora’s site from OBH’s site.177 These Web
surfers may have failed to continue searching for OBH’s site and instead
may have opted to select Tortora’s buffalonyapartments.com site or one
of the other news-related links that pointed to sites in direct competition
with OBH. In this way, the defendants’ appropriation of OBH’s mark
constituted use in connection with OBH’s distribution of its services.178
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney179 is another
example of a link providing a basis for use in commerce. The defendant
registered the domain name “peta.org” and created a Web site called
“People Eating Tasty Animals.”180 Doughney claimed he created the
Web site as a parody of the plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), a worldwide animal rights organization.181 The Web
site also included at least thirty links to various sites promoting meat,
fur, leather, hunting, and animal research organizations, all of which
held views antithetical to PETA’s views.182 The plaintiff brought suit
for federal, state, and common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition.183 The court relied in part on Doughney’s many links to
commercial operations offering goods and services to establish that the
mark was used in commerce, in connection with goods and services.184
Likewise, in Bihari v. Gross,185 the defendants were disgruntled excustomers of Ms. Bihari’s interior design services. The defendants
registered the domain names “bihari.com” and “bihariinteriors.com” in
order to criticize Bihari and Bihari Interiors. Also appearing on the Web
sites were links to Web sites that promoted the services of other interior
designers. Bihari brought suit for trademark infringement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. These links established commercial use
because they acted “as a conduit, steering potential customers away from
Bihari Interiors and toward its competitors, thereby transforming his
otherwise protected speech into a commercial use.”186
The issue of commercial use in connection with goods and services
177. Id. at 186.
178. Id.
179. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
180. Id. at 362–63.
181. Id. at 363.
182. Id. at 365.
183. Id. at 362.
184. Id. at 365.
185. 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see supra notes 93–109 and
accompanying text.
186. Id. at 318.
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arose in an unusual context in Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises.187 In
that case, the only use of the mark was in the programming code that
created a link to the plaintiff’s Web site. Ford Motor Co. (Ford) attempted
to prevent a hacker group from pointing the domain name
“fuckgeneralmotors.com” to Ford’s official Web site, ford.com.188 2600
Enterprises used the Ford mark in its programming code, which is
invisible to the Internet user but which creates an automatic hyperlink to
Although there was no content at the
the ford.com site.189
fuckgeneralmotors.com site, when Internet users entered this domain
name into a Web browser, they were automatically linked to the
ford.com Web site.190 Ford filed suit, alleging trademark infringement,
dilution, and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act.191 The
court denied Ford injunctive relief because the creation of an unseen,
programmatic link to Ford’s site was not a commercial use or a use in
connection with goods or services of the mark within the meaning of the
Lanham Act.192
In order to establish commercial use for its dilution claim, Ford relied
on earlier cases,193 in which the registration and use of domain names
incorporating another’s mark were found to dilute the mark.194 In each
cases, the defendant’s uses of the disputed domain names was
commercial because they promoted the defendant’s products or raised
funds for the defendant’s cause.195 Moreover, the domain names were
designed to harm the plaintiff commercially because they prevented the
plaintiff from using the mark and kept Internet users from locating the
plaintiff’s site.196 In contrast, 2600 Enterprises’ domain name did not
incorporate any of Ford’s trademarks, nor did it use Ford’s marks for its
own financial benefit.197 Instead, the only use of the Ford mark, in the
invisible programming code creating a link from fuckgeneralmotors.com

187. 177 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
188. Id. at 662.
189. Id. at 664.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 662.
192. Id. at 663–66.
193. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (stating that the defendant, an active participant in the antiabortion movement, registered the domain name plannedparenthood.com and set up a
Web site advertising an anti-abortion book); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282
(D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the defendant used the
plaintiff’s mark in the domain name jewsforjesus.com to raise funds through the sale of
merchandise).
194. Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
195. Id. at 664.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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to ford.com, was not a commercial use.198 According to the court, the
dilution statute’s commercial use requirement should not extend so far as
to include any use that the trademark holder may object to because of the
domain name or other content of the linking Web page.199 The court
disagreed with the earlier courts by finding that the commercial use
requirement was not satisfied simply because an unauthorized use may
disparage the mark’s owner.200
With respect to the claims for trademark infringement and unfair
competition, Ford failed to show that the mark was used in connection
with goods and services.201 2600 Enterprises’ use of the Ford mark in its
programming code, unlike the unauthorized use of a trademark as a
domain name, did not inhibit Internet users from reaching the Web sites
that were most likely to be associated with Ford.202 Moreover, because
the unauthorized use in no way competed with Ford’s offering of goods
or services, the “in connection with goods or services” requirement was
not satisfied simply because prospective users may have faced some
difficulty in finding the home page they sought.203
In cases like OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc.,204 wherein the
activity complained of consisted of providing links to third party sites or
to other sites that the defendant owned or controlled, a likelihood of
confusion generally only arises if the goods or services of the trademark
owner and the alleged infringer are the same or related. Links to third
party sites may implicate trademark infringement claims if they change
the nature of defendant’s business into one related to the plaintiff, and
may implicate dilution claims if the third party sites contain content that
tarnish the plaintiff’s mark.
For instance, in ImOn, Inc. v. ImaginOn, Inc.,205 links did not convert
the defendant’s Internet television software offered at imon.com into a
business similar to the plaintiff’s “Imon” Internet portal and dial-up
services.206 The court found that the services rendered in connection with
the Imon mark and the imon.com domain name were sufficiently different
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id.
86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
90 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 352–53.
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as to avoid a likelihood of confusion.207 The links from the defendant’s
imon.com site failed to make confusion more likely because they led to
other software products offered by defendant, such as a search engine, that
were not sufficiently competitive with the plaintiff’s business.208
However, in Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,209 links to
third party sites created a likelihood of confusion between the
defendant’s computer services offered at nissan.com and nissan.net and
the plaintiff’s automobile services.210 The defendant, Uzi Nissan, had
been using Nissan as a trademark and trade name for a variety of
businesses and registered the domain names “nissan.com” and
“nissan.net” to provide computer related services.211 The plaintiff
brought suit for trademark infringement when the defendant modified
these sites to include advertisements that linked to various third party
sites promoting and selling automobiles.212 The court found that the
defendant’s domain name infringed the plaintiff’s Nissan mark because
the car-related advertisements and links created a similarity in the goods
and services of the parties and reflected the defendant’s intent to confuse
consumers.213 The court allowed the defendant to continue conducting
its computer-related business under the Nissan mark, to use the Nissan
mark in its metatags, and to display third party advertisement and links
not related to cars, but prohibited it from displaying on its sites any carrelated advertising or links.214
V. CONCLUSION
Should trademarks, as one form of intellectual property, be protected
when used on the Internet? Yes. Some have argued that trademarks, or
any other kind of intellectual property, should not be protected to the
same extent as they are in the real world because the Internet should
provide a means of openly sharing information without the restrictions
or concerns about what is legal. However, as the Internet became more
and more commercial, trademark holders increasingly sought to protect
their trademarks and other means of source identification. The courts
have likewise responded by recognizing that consumers rely on brand
names and other means of source identification in the virtual world as
much as they do in the real world. As the cases discussed in this Article
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
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indicate, the courts are willing to tweak trademark law and unfair
competition principles to protect unauthorized uses that do not fit the
facts of traditional trademark infringement in the real world. The courts
should continue to shape trademark law to protect those unauthorized
uses that may not be visible to consumers and that may not even result in
a likelihood of consumer confusion, but nonetheless give competitors an
unfair advantage. In particular, trademark holders should be able to
assert their trademark rights to block those actions and technologies that
allow for unfair competition, specifically, those actions that allow others
to free ride and benefit from the goodwill generated by the trademark
holder and potentially divert consumers away from the trademark holder.
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